Succeeding in Afghanistan / by George Grant.
Material type:
TextLanguage: Publication details: London : The Henry Jackson Society, 2010.Description: [4], v, 76 p. ; 30 cmSubject(s): DDC classification: - Pamphlet DS 371.4 .G73 .S83 /2010
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
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Books
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Afghanistan Centre at Kabul University | Pamphlet DS 371.4 .G73 .S83 /2010 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 26513 |
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| Serial JQ 1766 .I633 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Independent Directorate of Local Governance (LDLG)./IDLG annual report / Independent Directorate of Local Governance (LDLG). | MB 2.12607 ABD -2444 UNHCR & UNDP/OPS repatriation and rehabilitation survey: eastern Paktia [map] / drawn by Abdullah.-- Scale 1:100,000 | Pamphlet NA 1492 .N36 .S83 /1992 Stabilized brick production in Agam / GTZ Domestic Energy Saving Project | Pamphlet DS 371.4 .G73 .S83 /2010 Succeeding in Afghanistan / by George Grant. | Pamphlet HG 5720.6 .A34 2007 Afghanistan, the silk road to opportunities : foreign investors guide. | Pamphlet HT 384 .A34 .K33 /2006 Kabul urban policy notes series. | Kabul urban policy notes series. |
“Includes bibliography”—(p. 68-70).
“The Henry Jackson Society”—cover page.
“If you believe in the cause of freedom, then proclaim it, live it and protect it, for humanity’s future depends on it”—back cover.
Contents: Foreword—Acknowledgements—Acronyms—Executive summary—Introduction—Chapter I : the course of operations between 2001-2009 and why they did not succeed—Chapter II : the strategy for success in Afghanistan—Chapter III : Taliban divisions—Chapter IV : the ramifications of failure—Conclusion—Endnotes—Bibliography.
Summary: “The conflict in Afghanistan can and must be won. The purpose of this report is to explicate the strategy currently in place; to argue why it is the right one; and to emphasise that success in Afghanistan is not just a humanitarian imperative, but a strategic one also. The worst option that the governments of coalition forces could therefore take is to pledge an unconditional withdrawal from Afghanistan without understanding that the current strategy is both viable and necessary…”—(p. 1).