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041			_aE
082			_aPamphlet HD 9502 .A47 .C66 /2010/ + /PDF/(698KB)
110			_aSpecial Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).
245			_aContract delays led to cost overruns for the Kabul power plant and sustainability remains a key challenge / Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).
260			_a[S.l.] : Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), 2010.
300			_aiii, 22 p. : ill. ; 30 cm.
500			_a“January 20, 2010”.
500			_aIncludes bibliographical references.
500			_a“SIGAR Audit-10-6 contractor performance and oversight”—cover page.
500			_aSummary: “Current risks for the Kabul power plant focus on its long-term sustainability, which will be affected by the GIRoA’s ability to generate sufficient revenue to pay for fuel and O&M expenses. USAID has taken steps to assist the GIRoA with its ongoing commercialization efforts. Nonetheless, USAID officials believe this process will take at least five years to complete and plans exist to cover the plant’s O&M costs for several years after turnover to the GIRoA. Whether the Kabul electric utility will have sufficient revenues in five years to assume these costs is open to debate. If the plant is not turned over to Afghan authorities within this time frame, USAID may face the difficult decision of whether to continue funding the plant’s operations or terminating U.S. involvement with the project and placing the plant’s future operation at risk. SIGAR further found that long-term sustainability is complicated by the decision by the GIRoA and USAID to construct a dual fuel instead of a diesel-only plant, providing the Afghans with a technically sophisticated fueling option they may not have the capacity to sustain”—(p. 13, conclusion).
546			_aEnglish
650			_aEnergy policy – Afghanistan.
650			_aPower resources – Afghanistan.
650			_aEnergy sector – Afghanistan.
650			_aPostwar reconstruction – Afghanistan.
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906			_a8670
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