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050	0	0	_aDS79.765. _bG7. _cL43 2011
100	1		_aLedwidge, Frank.
245	1	0	_aLosing small wars : _bBritish military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan / _cFrank Ledwidge.
260			_aNew Haven : _bYale University Press, _cc2011.
300			_aviii, 308 p. ; _c24 cm.
505			_aContents: Ridiculous expectations—Defeated, pure and simple—Where's Helmand?—A bleeding ulcer—Dereliction of duty : the generals and strategy—Cracking on: British military culture and doctrine—Tactics without strategy? The counterinsurgency conundrum—Doing no harm? The question of force—Civvies—Bad influences—Opening networks.
520			_aAbstract: Partly on the strength of their apparent success in "small wars" such as Malaya and Northern Ireland, the British armed forces have long been perceived as world class, if not world-beating. Yet under British control Basra degenerated into a lawless city riven with militia violence and fear, while tactical mistakes and strategic incompetence in Helmand province resulted in numerous casualties and a burgeoning opium trade. In both cases the British were eventually and humiliatingly baled out by the US military. In this thoughtful and compellingly readable book, former military intelligence officer Frank Ledwidge, a veteran of both campaigns, examines the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, asking how and why it went so wrong. With the aid of copious research, interviews with senior officers and his own experiences, he looks in detail at how British strategy is developed and how senior officers are trained. He discusses the culture of the British military and argues that at the root of these flawed operations has been a reliance on obsolete structures, approaches and tactics, a culture of not asking difficult questions and -- above all -- an inability to adapt to new challenges. This is an eye-opening analysis of the causes of military failure, and its enormous costs.
650		0	_aIraq War, 2003-2011 _x Participation, British.
650		0	_aIraq War, 2003-2011 _x Campaigns _z Iraq _z Baṣrah.
650		0	_aAfghan War, 2001- _x Participation, British.
650		0	_aAfghan War, 2001- _x Campaigns _z Afghanistan _z Helmand River Valley.
650		0	_aStrategic culture _z Great Britain.
651		0	_aGreat Britain _x Armed Forces _x Management.
651		0	_aGreat Britain _x Military policy.
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999			_c23970 _d23970