000			03024cam a22004215a 4500
001			16939787
003			OSt
005			20170305044422.0
008			110830s2011 caua b 000 0 eng c
010			_a 2011283881
020			_a0833052489
020			_a9780833052483
035			_a(OCoLC)ocn740456789
040			_aSYB _cSYB _dAFQ _dYDXCP _dIXA _dBTCTA _dCGU _dDLC _dACKU
041			_a124
042			_alccopycat
043			_aa-af---
050	0	0	_aPamphlet DS371.4. _bP38 2011
100	1		_aPaul, Christopher, _d1971-
245	1	0	_aCounterinsurgency scorecard : _bAfghanistan in early 2011 relative to the insurgencies of the past 30 years / _cChristopher Paul.
260			_aSanta Monica : _bRAND National Defense Research Institute, _c2011.
300			_av, 19 p. : _bill. ; _c28 cm.
490	1		_aOccasional paper ; _vOP-337-OSD
500			_a“Approved for public release; distribution unlimited”—title page. “RAND National Defense Research Institute”—cover page.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references
520			_aSummary: The previously published RAND monograph, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, used detailed case studies of the 30 insurgencies worldwide begun and completed between 1978 and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). A core finding was that a case’s score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 12 equally weighted bad COIN factors and practices perfectly predicted the outcome of those 30 insurgencies. That is, the balance of good and bad factors and practices correlated with either a COIN win (insurgency loss) or a COIN loss (insurgency win) in the overall case. Using the scorecard approach as its foundation, a RAND project sought to extend the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2011. The effort involved an expert elicitation, or Delphi, exercise in which experts were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the factors to complete the scorecard for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The consensus results revealed that early 2011 Afghanistan scores in the middle of the historical record in terms of COIN wins and losses: its score was lower than that in the lowest-scoring historical COIN win but higher than that in the highest-scoring COIN loss. This suggests an uncertain outcome in Afghanistan, but the findings may help provide additional guidance as operations continue.
530			_aAlso available via the internet.
546			_a124
650		0	_aCounterinsurgency _zAfghanistan.
650		0	_aCounterinsurgency _vCase studies.
650		0	_aAfghan War, 2001-.
651		0	_aAfghanistan _x Politics and government _y2001-.
651		0	_aAfghanistan _x History _y 2001-.
710	2		_aRand Corporation.
710	2		_aNational Defense Research Institute (U.S.)
942			_2lcc _cMON
999			_c27000 _d27000