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043			_aa-af---
050	0	0	_aPamphlet U241. _bP385 2013
100	1		_aPaul, Christopher, _d1971-.
245	1	0	_aCounterinsurgency scorecard : _bAfghanistan in early 2013 relative to insurgencies since world war II / _cChristopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, Molly Dunigon.
260			_aSanta Monica, CA : _bRAND Corporation, _c©2013.
300			_ax, 25 pages ; _c30 cm.
504			_6Includes bibliographical references.
520			_aSummary: “The RAND report Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies added 41 new cases to a previously studied set of 30 insurgencies, examining the 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide between World War II and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). A key finding of this research was that a case's score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 11 equally weighted bad COIN factors and practices perfectly discriminated the outcomes of the cases analyzed. That is, the balance of good and bad factors and practices correlated with either a COIN win (insurgency loss) or a COIN loss (insurgency win) in the overall case. Using the scorecard approach as its foundation, a RAND study sought to apply the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2013. The effort involved an expert elicitation, or Delphi exercise, in which experts were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the factors to complete the scorecard for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The consensus results revealed that early 2013 Afghanistan ranks among the historical COIN winners, but its score is equal to those of the lowest-scoring historical wins. This tenuous position points to several areas in need of improvement, but particularly the need to disrupt the flow of insurgent support and the need for the Afghan government and Afghan security forces to better demonstrate their commitment and motivation. Afghanistan in early 2011 scored in the middle of the historical record in terms of COIN wins and losses, suggesting an overall improvement in COIN progress in that conflict by early 2013. However, conditions may change as coalition forces prepare to hand over responsibility for the country's security to the Afghan government and Afghan security forces in 2014”.
546			_a124
650		0	_aCounterinsurgency _z Afghanistan.
650		0	_aCounterinsurgency _x Case studies.
650		0	_aCounterinsurgency.
651		0	_aAfghanistan.
856			_qPDF _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2458/azu_acku_pamphlet_u241_p385_2013 _zScanned for ACKU.
942			_2lcc _cMON _kazu_acku_pamphlet_u241_p385_2013
999			_c37914 _d37914