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082			_aPamphlet HC 417 .J64 2010/ + /PDF/(274KB)
100			_aJohnson, Charles Michael.
110			_aUnited States Government Accountability Office.
245			_aAfghanistan development : USAID continues to face challenges in managing and overseeing U.S. development assistance programs : testimony before the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Committee on Appropriations / Charles Michael Johnson.
260			_a[Washington, DC] : United States Government Accountability Office, 2010.
300			_a14, [2] p. ; 30 cm.
500			_aCover page.
500			_a“July 15, 2010”.
500			_a“United States Government Accountability Office”—at head of title.
500			_a“GAO-10-932T”—cover page.
500			_aIncludes bibliographical references.
500			_a“GAO, Accountability, Integrity, Reliability”—cover page.
500			_aSummary: Various factors challenge U.S. efforts to ensure proper management and oversight of U.S. development efforts in Afghanistan. Among the most significant has been the high-threat working environment, the difficulties in preserving institutional knowledge due to the lack of a formal mechanism for retaining and sharing information during staff turnover, and the Afghan government ministries' lack of capacity and corruption challenges. USAID has taken some steps to assess and begin addressing the limited capacity and corruption challenges associated with Afghan ministries. In addition, USAID has established performance management and evaluation procedures for managing and overseeing its assistance programs. These procedures, among other things, require (1) the development of a Mission Performance Management Plan (PMP); (2) the establishment and approval of implementing partner performance indicators and targets; and (3) analyses and use of performance data. Although USAID disseminated alternative monitoring methods for projects in high-threat environments such as Afghanistan, USAID has generally required the same performance management and evaluation procedures in Afghanistan as it does in other countries in which it operates. USAID has not consistently followed its established performance management and evaluation procedures. There were various areas in which the USAID Mission to Afghanistan (Mission) needed to improve upon. In particular, we found that the Mission had been operating without an approved PMP to guide its management and oversight efforts after 2008. In addition, while implementing partners have routinely reported on the progress of USAID's programs, we found that USAID did not always approve the performance indicators these partners were using, and that USAID did not ensure, as its procedures require, that its implementing partners establish targets for each performance indicator. For example, only 2 of 7 USAID-funded agricultural programs active during fiscal year 2009, included in our review, had targets for all of their indicators. We also found that USAID could improve its assessment and use of performance data submitted by implementing partners or program evaluations to, among other things, help identify strengths or weaknesses of ongoing or completed programs. Moreover, USAID needs to improve documentation of its programmatic decisions and put mechanisms in place for program managers to transfer knowledge to their successors.—(p. 2, Summary).
650			_aEconomic assistance, American – Afghanistan – Evaluation.
650			_aEconomic assistance – Afghanistan – Evaluation.
650			_aUnited States. Agency for International Development – Evaluation.
650			_aAfghanistan – Economic conditions.
650			_aEconomic assistance – Afghanistan.
650			_aAfghanistan – Economic policy.
856			_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2458/azu_acku_pamphlet_hc417_j64_2010 _qPDF _zScanned for ACKU.
906			_a10475
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